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I. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
VS. 
TODD MULLINER, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No: 20170552-CA 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CORRECTING AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
A. The State concedes the sentence is illegal 
In the first substantive sentence of its argument, the State concedes that 
Mulliner's "sentence is ambiguous or, at best, internally contradictory." State's 
Brief at 10. The State admits, "[t]he sentence needs to be corrected." State's Brief 
at 10. But, from the State's perspective, that correction is a resentencing 
performed by the district court, untethered from the restrictions of any of the 
other sentences, unbound by the any of orders of the original sentencing court. 
Mulliner disagrees with some of the State's position, but to be clear, both parties 
agree, Judge Low's sentencing order issued on June 26, 2017 is illegal and must 
be corrected. The only question for this Court to decide is how that correction will 
occur and what the corrected sentence can be. Mulliner asserts that there is no 
need for a remand, and in fact, the trial court's discretion to issue a new sentence 
"' is limited by the doctrine of double jeopardy and Utah law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. Mulliner should not be resentenced by the district court, the 
illegal sentence should be corrected by this Court 
1. Rule 22 allows this Court to correct the sentence 
The State's brief argues that because the sentence is illegal it is void, and 
because it is void it has no legal effect, and because it has no legal effect it does 
not and cannot create, impair, or affect any rights. State's Brief at 10-11. What any 
of this has to do with this Court's ability to correct the sentence is unclear. 
What is clear from the case law is that this Court need not remand this case 
to correct an illegal sentence. "When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate 
court can vacate the illegal sentence without first remanding the case to the trial 
court. .. " State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). "When the pertinent 
facts are undisputed and a purely legal question with respect to which the trial 
court has no discretion remains to be decided, nothing is to be gained by 
remanding the case to the trial court." Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (citing State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
This is not a case like State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ,I27, 31 P.3d 615, 
where the defendant failed to appear for sentencing, was sentenced in absentia, 
and appealed because his attorney was not allowed to argue "relevant and reliable 
information" in mitigation of punishment. There, after having found the 
defendant's right to allocution was denied where the sentencing court did not 
comply with rule 22, this Court "vacate[d] [the] sentences and remand[ed] for 
resentencing." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ,I33. But that resolution, a remand for 
resentencing, was tailored specifically to the requested remedy in that case. The 
2 
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defendant had been sentenced to the maximum allowable term after he had failed 
to appear at his sentencing hearing and the court had not allowed his attorney to 
present any argument about what sentence should be imposed. The defendant 
wanted the opportunity to present to the district court, the court specifically 
granted authority to receive sentencing arguments and decide (at least in the case 
of misdemeanors) how much of the maximum allowable sentence will be 
imposed, details about his life, his history, his plans for the future, his attempts to 
make amends, etc. That is what was denied, and that is what he was seeking to be 
restored on appeal. 
This case is not like Wanosik at all. Mulliner had his chance to present his 
best case at a sentencing hearing. See R.044-46. Mulliner is not asking that any 
court exercise its discretion in deciding what his punishment should be, 
Mulliner's hope for a sentencing court to exercise leniency in sentencing 
evaporated long ago. The only question raised in this appeal is what his 
punishment can be. The only thing to be decided is what the law allows. Mulliner 
does not intend that his sentence will be reduced because of any mitigating fact. 
There are no witnesses to present, no letters of recommendation to consider, no 
pleas for mercy. There is only the record, the convictions, and the law. This Court 
I.@ is certainly capable of examining these things and creating a legal sentence. And 
to be fair, given the history of this case, the district court's record of trying to 
impose a legal sentence in this case does not give Mulliner any confidence that 
the district court's fourth attempt will be any better than the last three . 
..... 
_, 
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As will be explained below, at this point there are only two possible ways 
the sentence in this case can legally be imposed, and Mulliner would stipulate to 
either iteration. This Court can and should correct the illegalities in the current 
sentence. To simply accept the State's concession, find the sentence illegal and 
remand for resentencing would not only subject Mulliner to the threat of yet 
another illegal sentence, given the reality of how long these things often take, it 
would potentially expose him to serving beyond the maxim um penalty for his 
cnmes. 
2. There are only two legal and constitutional outcomes, 
Mulliner will stipulate to either 
i. Mulliner has a legitimate expectation of finality in 
his original sentence for Count 1, to change Count 1 
would violate Double Jeopardy 
The State has claimed that the trial court should "exercise its discretion to 
determine whether Counts 1 and 2 should run concurrent or consecutive to each 
other and whether they should run concurrent or consecutive to the St. George 
Sentence by considering 'the gravity and circumstances of Mulliner's offenses, the 
number of victims, and his history, character, and rehabilitative needs ... "' State's 
Brief at 11 (citing UTAH CODE §76-3-401(2)). According to the State, there is 
discretion in that decision, such that it must be performed by the district court in 
isolation from any of the earlier sentences. State's Brief at 11. 
The State also argues that, "even if the prior sentences have some effect on 
resentencing, they do not support Mulliner's proposal" because of the "modicum 
of accountability" language used by Judge Schofield in 2004. State's Brief at 11-
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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12. Mulliner stands by his arguments, made both to this court and to Judge Low; 
~ his proposal accounts for all the language used in the initial order and his 
proposal is the only legal way to do so. But for the sake of argument, Mulliner 
asks the Court to consider what the proposal offered by the State, or any other 
possible configuration, would mean for Mulliner who has been in prison or on 
parole since 2003. If this Court were to allow the district court to consider the 
~ sentence proposed by the State, that sentence would violate Double Jeopardy. 
"The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy 'has been said to 
consist of three separate constitutional protections."' State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, 
,I30, 274 P.3d 919. The first two protections do not apply to this case. 1 The third is 
that "it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Prion, 2012 
UT 15, ,I30 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). See also Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, ,In, 106 P.3d 707. 
This protection has been interpreted to prevent a resentencing when a person has 
a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence. 2 
In the St. George case, Mulliner was sentenced on July 2, 2003. That 1-15 
years sentence began running that day and Mulliner began getting credit against 
that 1-15 years that day. In this case, Mulliner was sentenced on March 17, 2004. 
1 
"It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It 
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction." 
Prion, ,I30 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717). 
'-' 
2 See State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, ,i,i17-18, 322 P.3d 1184 (where sentencing 
judge said concurrent at sentencing but corrected that to consecutive within a 
day, defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality). 
5 
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There is no doubt, not in the initial order, not in Judge Laycock's amended order, 
not in Judge Low's second amended order, that Count 1 was to run concurrent 
with the St. George case. 
And as explained in Mulliner's initial brief, and accepted by the State in its 
brief, concurrent means Count 1 began running immediately and Mulliner began 
getting credit against that 0-5 years that day. The moment Judge Schofield 
announced that Count 1 would run concurrent with the St. George case, 
Mulliner's legitimate expectation of finality in that portion of the order began. 
Unlike the defendant in Perkins, Mulliner had a legitimate expectation that 
Count 1 was running concurrent with the St. George case and any attempt to 
change that now, 14 years after Judge Schofield ordered concurrent sentences, 
would conflict with that expectation. Mulliner legitimately believed that each day 
he served counted against the St. George time and against Count 1. 
After serving 5 years,3 the sentence in Count 1 was completed. Now, nearly 
14 years later, there is no doubt that each day required by the concurrent 0-5 
years in Count 1 has been served and cannot be ordered to be served again. If this 
Court were to grant the district court authority to resentence Mulliner on Count 1 
3 Of course, the exact details of what days counted against that five years can take 
some precision. Obviously, every day in prison counts and, according to UTAH 
CODE §76-3-202(7)(a), each day on parole without a violation counts. But days 
after a violation but prior to revocation do not. See UTAH CODE §76-3-202(7)(b). 
Determining exactly which days of Mulliner's parole count, and which days do 
not, is outside the scope of this appeal and will be left to the Board of Pardons. 
The point, however, is that after March 17, 2004, Mulliner was serving and 
getting credit, both in prison and on parole, for serving his 0-5 year sentence in 
Count 1. 
6 
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and 2, and the court decided, as the State suggests it should, that Count 1 will run 
concurrent with Count 2 and that both should run consecutive to the St. George 
case, Mulliner's freedom from Double Jeopardy would be violated because he 
would be ordered to serve that 5 years twice. That cannot happen. The State 
concedes that Count 2 cannot run twice. State's Brief at 10. That the State fails to 
acknowledge that Count 1 cannot run twice must be an oversight. 
The sentence on Count 1 is served, it is finished, and no Court can order 
Mulliner to serve it again without violating the constitution. And herein lies the 
problem with the State's position. The State believes that the district court should 
start over and decide what the relationship between Count 1 and Count 2 is, and 
what the relationship between this case and the St. George is. But the relationship 
between Count 1 and the St. George case is already set in stone, because it has 
already been served. This indisputable fact, combined with the passage of time, 
vJI makes the traditional discretion afforded to trial courts in sentencing irrelevant. 
ii. There are only two constitutional outcomes 
With these three charges (two 0-5 counts in this case and the 1-15 in the St. 
George case), there are only 4 possible scenarios that comply with UTAH CODE 
§76-3-401(1)4• For the sake of argument, Mulliner describes each of the possible 
4 UTAH CODE §76-3-401(1) requires the sentencing court to determine whether 
multiple sentences are imposed concurrent or consecutive and specifically must 
state on the record "if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or 
~ consecutively to each other; and ... if the sentences before the court are to run 
concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already 
. " serving. 
7 
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sentences a sentencing judge could reach at the State's proposed resentencing 
hearing. 
Scenario A: the court orders Count 1 to run concurrent with 
Count 2 and orders this case to run consecutive to the St. George 
case.5 
July 2 , 2003 
I 
July 1, 2018 
__ ___,.,........._1 i 
St. George case (1-15 years) Count 1 (0-5 years) 
Count 2 (0-5 years) 
i 
July 1, 2023 
Scenario A 
Scenario B: the court orders Count 1 to run consecutive with 
Count 2 and orders this case to run consecutive to the St. George 
case.6 
.July 2, 2003 July 1, 2018 
! ! 
St. George cuse (1-lS yeaTs) Count 1 (0-5 years) Count 2 (0-5 years) 
i 
July 1, 2023 
Scenario B 
s This is the State's new proposal on appeal. See State's Brief at 13. 
6 Neither pa rty, nor any of the sentencing courts, have suggested this iteration. It 
is only offered here to show possible iterations of legal sentence according to the 
statutes. 
8 
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• 
• 
Scenario C: the court orders Count 1 to run concurrent with 
Count 2 and orders this case to run concurrent with the St. 
George case.7 
.July 2, 2003 
·i July 1, 2018 ! 
St. George case (1-15 years) 
Count 1 (0-5 years) 
Cotmt 2 (0-5 years) 
i 
March 17, 2004 
i 
March 16, 2009 Scenario C 
Scenario D: the court orders Count 1 to run consecutive to Count 
2 and orders this case to run concurrent with the St. George case. 8 
July 2, 2003 
! 
J uly 1, 2018 
! 
St. George case (1-15 years) 
Count 1 (0-5 years) Count 2 (0-5 years) 
i 
March 17, 2004 
i 
March 16, 2009 
Scenario D 
7 Neither party, nor any of the sentencing courts, have suggested this iteration. It 
is only offered here to show possible iterations of legal sentence according to the 
statutes. 
8 This is Mulliner's proposal and he maintains it is consistent with the language 
of the original order and it complies with the statutory requirements. See R.148-
49, R.259, Appellant's Brief 17-18. 
9 
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Each of these four scenarios is 'legal' in the sense that they properly account for 
the relationship between Count 1 and 2, and the relationship between this case 
and the St. George case, so they each satisfy the requirements of UTAH CODE §76-
3-401(1). However, Scenarios A and B have a constitutional problem. As 
explained above, Mulliner has already served all 5 years on Count 1. His 
legitimate expectation that Count 1 ran concurrent with the St. George case was 
reaffirmed by each of the sentencing judges. That sentence has expired. Because 
Scenarios A and B would order Mulliner to serve Count 1 again, consecutive to 
the St. George case, they would violate Double Jeopardy. It would subject 
Mulliner to multiple punishments for the same crime. Scenarios A and B are not 
available to any court; not to this Court, nor to the district court in the State's 
proposed resentencing. 
That leaves two possible sentences. Mulliner would stipulate to either of 
the two constitutional options remaining. Scenario C, the more lenient of the two, 
would have both Count 1 and Count 2 begin on March 17, 2004 and end 5 years 
later. The only reason any court should hesitate to impose this sentence is that it 
would not account for the "consecutive" language in the original sentencing order 
and the court's stated intent to impose "some modicum of separate 
accountability." R.046. 
Scenario D, Mulliner's proposal, would have Count 1 begin on March 17, 
2004 and ends years later, and have Count 2 begin immediately thereafter, both 
counts running concurrent with the St. George case. As Mulliner has consistently 
10 
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maintained, this sentence accounts for the statutory requirements, accounts for 
Judge Schofield's language, and does not violate the constitution. 9 
Scenarios C and D are the only two sentencing options available to any 
court tasked with correcting Mulliner's sentence. Whether it is this Court, or the 
district court on remand, there are only two ways this correction can go. Given 
the lack of any controversy about what sentences can be imposed, and given 
Mulliner's concession that either would satisfy him, is there any purpose in 
remanding the case to the district court for resentencing? Mulliner can think of 
no reason, at least none that can have any meaningful impact on the case, to 
remand the case to the district court for resentencing. 
There is, however, a threat of prejudice to Mulliner if this Court declines to 
correct the sentence and merely remands for resentencing, as the State proposes. 
Although the record does not include the exact number of days Mulliner has been 
given credit for serving (both in prison and on parole), the statutory maximum 
for the St. George case is 15 years. As the diagrams in each of the briefs have 
9 The State has argued that Mulliner's proposal does not account for the 
"modicum of separate accountability" language in Judge Schofield's initial order. 
State's Brief at 12. The State believes Judge Schofield must have intended Count 
to 2 to have separate accountability from the St. George case, so the consecutive 
language must have meant consecutive to St. George. But it is reasonable to 
assume that the "modicum of separate accountability" the judge wanted was from 
Count 1 and the consecutive language meant Count 1 and Count 2 must be served 
separately. To assume, as the State does, that Judge Schofield intended a 
sentence that violated UTAH CODE §76-3-401(1) (by not establishing a concurrent 
or consecutive relationship between Count 1 and Count 2) violates the appellate 
principle of regularity. Because there is a legal way to interpret that unclear 
language, we should apply that legal interpretation. 
I I 
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suggested, that time is set to expire sometime after July 1, 2018 (depending upon 
how many days Mulliner was held after he violated parole). 10 If Mulliner is 
correct, and the sentences for Count 1 and 2 must run concurrent with the St. 
George case, then the total time for those counts expired approximately 4 years 
and 3 months before the St. George sentence expires. That means when the St. 
George case expires, Mulliner has no more time to serve on these cases and 
holding him after that time (sometime after July 1, 2018) would be illegal. This 
brief is being filed in February of 2018. It is unlikely that this Court will hear oral 
argument and issue a decision prior to July of 2018, let alone have the case 
remanded to the district court and perform the State's proposed resentencing. 
Everyday Mulliner serves in prison after that time is beyond the time the law 
allows for his sentence. This is significant prejudice. Instead of jumping through 
these hoops~ at the risk of holding Mulliner in prison beyond the legal maxinitim, 
especially where the State has agreed the sentence must be corrected, this Court 
should correct the sentence itself by imposing Mulliner's proposed sentence. 
iii. Resentencing would violate Utah law 
In addition to the constitutional problems, the State's proposal for a 
resentencing before the district court, where the court would not be bound by the 
earlier sentences (State's Brief at 11), would run afoul of a controlling Utah 
statute. "Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense 
10 See fn. 3 above. 
12 
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or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than 
I.@ the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied." 
UTAH CODE §76-3-405(1). 
Both parties agree, the sentence imposed by Judge Low is illegal and must 
be set aside. No new offenses or conduct are at issue. When the corrected 
sentence is imposed, it cannot be more severe than the prior sentence. If, as the 
State suggests, the district court were to order Count 1 to run concurrent with 
Count 2 with both running consecutive to the St. George case (see State's Brief at 
13), it would be imposing a new sentence for Count 1 which is more severe than 
the prior sentence. Count 1 was originally ordered to run concurrent with St. 
George. To later order it to run consecutive to St. George would be more severe -
and would violate §76-3-405(1). If the corrected sentence is going to follow §76-
3-405(1), and the constitution, then there is no reason to have the district court 
involved at all. This Court can and should simply impose Mulliner's proposal 
(Scenario D). 
CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RELIEF SOUGHT 
The parties agree that the sentencing order must be corrected. It would 
violate double jeopardy and Utah law to issue any sentence where Count 1 does 
~ not run concurrent with the St. George case. Because there are only two legal and 
constitutional ways to correct the sentence, either of which Mulliner would 
stipulate to, there is no need for the case to be remanded to the district court for 
13 
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resentencing. This Court can and should correct the sentence as described in 
Mulliner's proposal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of February, 2018. 
Isl Douglas Thompson 
Appointed Appellate Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(a)(11) 
I certify that this brief complies with the following requirements of Rule 
24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
A. The total word count of this brief is 3,827. It was prepared in Microsoft 
Word. 
B. Neither this brief, nor its addendum, contains any non-public information 
as described in Rule 21(g). 
Isl Douglas Thompson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I emailed a copy of the foregoing brief and mailed two paper 
copies, postage prepaid, to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division, 
criminalappeals(wagutah.gov, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
on this 15th day of February, 2018. 
Isl Douglas Thompson 
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